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Castrataro,♠ Tania Bubela,† Shawn Harmon,☼ Graham Dutfield ± and Patricia 
Barclay◊ 
 
Abstract 
Intellectual property rights play a central role in biotechnology innovation. Patents, in 
particular, preoccupy research funding agencies, venture capitalists and governments, 
despite the fact that the value of patents is disputed and their impact continues to 
foster controversy. Perhaps more crucially to a fuller understanding of innovation, 
focus on instruments of intellectual property protection over-illuminates one stage of 
the flow of knowledge in innovation, leaving up- and down-stream phases in relative 
obscurity. Knowledge is an intangible asset, and is produced, tracked, managed, and 
accounted for in innovation systems. Yet what remains unclear, and this is 
problematic, are the respective roles of knowledge and intellectual property 
management, their relation, and the potential of a broadened perspective on 
knowledge flows in innovation. Participants at a Canada-U.K. workshop in Edinburgh 
examined the relationship between intellectual property rights and knowledge 
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management by framing innovation in terms of knowledge management while 
attempting to bracket off the effects of patenting – the “Un-IP” approach. Eight 
critical issues arising at the heart of knowledge management and intellectual property 
rights were articulated, and general consensus emerged that, conceptually speaking, 
intellectual property rights needed to be subsumed under knowledge management as a 
particular class of intangible asset. At the same time, however, practical issues 
associated with patents continued to dominate the discussion, causing deviation away 
from the primary theme of the workshop, and highlighting the need to more fully 
explore eight emerging themes and contextualise the role of intellectual property 
rights. 
[Support for this research was provided by Genome Canada through the Ontario 
Genomics Institute and Genome Alberta].  
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1. Introduction 
Wealth creation and the assessment of prosperity are increasingly tied to science and 
technology based innovation. Knowledge drives innovation, but knowledge is 
intangible and defies easy management using methods developed to create, track, 
value and account for tangible assets. Inventors, innovators, venture capitalists, 
companies, governments and civil society all have a stake in the management of 
knowledge, and recognise the magnitude of the challenge behind any demand for 
effective management of innovation systems. For these and related reasons, formal 
law-based systems for intellectual property management have come to the fore, 
demonstrating that innovation is indeed occurring. Intellectual property, particularly 
patents, have a multiplicity of functions as countable inputs and outputs of innovation 
systems, exchange tokens, social signals, factors in the coordination of innovation, 
strategic building blocks in securing competitive market positions, and so on. Patents 
are so central to conceptions of innovation that entire innovation systems are being 
conceived in terms of the dynamics of intellectual property protection.  
Whether patents can be relied upon to serve all of the functions demanded of them, 
and whether there is a need to reconceptualise innovation systems was the question 
put to a group of Scottish and Canadian experts. Recognising that critiques of 
patenting, and especially licensing behaviour, have in recent years gained notoriety as 
alternatives such as open-source and patent pools are considered and tested, the 
workshop participants explored a path that is less often taken. The less common, 
alternative, approach to intellectual property views it as one among other kinds of 
intangible asset requiring active management. Although an extensive knowledge 
management literature exists, it has not effectively located formal intellectual property 
management within the broader and more important exercise of knowledge generation 
and management. 
The exploration of these themes begins with a discussion of the advent of knowledge-
based economies in which the management of intellectual assets is a serious 
challenge. Intellectual property rights are but one type of knowledge asset, and there 
is a broader context of intangible asset management that is easily lost when attention 
is paid exclusively to intellectual property rights. How this happens is explained in the 
third section, in which the over-reliance on intellectual property rights as a metric of 
innovation is discussed. The several problems discussed in this section, combined 
with the discussion of knowledge management from the preceding section, sets the 
context for a new conception of intellectual property rights as a type of managed 
knowledge in innovation systems. By contextualising and deemphasising the role of 
intellectual property rights – the ‘un-IP’ heuristic – a set of alternative priorities 
emerges regarding the management of knowledge in innovation systems. These eight 
themes are discussed in detail in the latter half of the paper, and lead to some general 
conclusions about how knowledge management and innovation systems ought to be 
construed, and how intellectual property rights within such systems should be 
interpreted, as well as suggestions for the direction of future research.  
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2. Knowledge Management, Intellectual Property Rights and Innovation 
Post-industrial economies are often called ‘knowledge economies,’ reflecting their 
transition from resource extraction and primary manufacturing to an economy based 
on a greater proportion of high technology manufacturing and knowledge intensive 
services. Firm resources are now eighty percent intangible assets and twenty percent 
tangible and capital resources – the inverse of the relative contribution of tangible and 
intangible assets fifty years ago.1 In addition to the changing composition of corporate 
assets, hallmarks of knowledge economies include literate and numerate citizens, 
demographic transition, robust internet and telecommunications infrastructure, and 
extensive government coordination of research and development in science and 
technology. To maintain a competitive trajectory in the knowledge economy, 
countries expend considerable resources directly on the maintenance of their scientific 
and technological base. Annual government expenditure on research and development 
in knowledge economies, as a proportion of gross domestic product, tends to be 
maintained at two percent, but in exceptional cases may be over three percent.  
Being increasingly reliant on science and technology as a means of remaining 
globally competitive, governments implement policies and programs to stimulate and 
coordinate private and public investment in science and technology research and 
development.2 Government involvement is closer to cultivation than it is to 
implementation, for constant encouragement and a watchful eye are necessary to 
support “the network of institutions in the public and private sectors whose activities 
and interactions initiate, import, modify and diffuse new technologies.”3 A useful 
expansion of Freeman’s original definition of ‘innovation system’ by Fagerberg 
reveals the extensive linkages and complex interdependencies in innovation systems: 
The narrow definition would include organisations and institutions 
involved in searching and exploring – such as R&D departments, 
technological institutes and universities. The broad definition . . . 
includes all parts and aspects of the economic structure and the 
institutional set-up affecting learning as well as searching and 
exploring the production system, the marketing system and the 
system of finance present themselves as subsystems in which 
learning takes place.4 
With such significant system interdependencies and economic dependence on science 
and technology innovation driving the knowledge economy comes recognition of the 
                                                 
1
 N Al-Ali, Comprehensive Intellectual Capital Management (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons, 
2003). 
2
 PWB Phillips and D Castle “Science and Technology Spending: Still no Viable Federal Innovation 
Agenda” In B Doern and C Stoney How Ottawa Spends 2010-2011: Recession and Realignment 
in the Harper-Ignatieff Minority Parliament, 31st Edition (McGill-Queen's University Press, 
2010) 144-62. 
3
 C Freeman, Technology and Economic Performance: Lessons from Japan (London: Pinter, 1987). 
4
 B-A Lundvall, National Systems of Innovation. Towards a Theory of Innovation and Interactive 
Learning (London: Pinter, 1992). 
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need to identify tacit and codified knowledge stocks in an innovation system, and to 
manage the creation, tracking, circulation and ownership of knowledge.5 
Theories of knowledge management seek to understand how knowledge, as an 
intangible asset, is produced, tracked, used, managed and valued in innovation 
systems.6 In one general model of innovation, Phillips explicitly acknowledges that 
there is a range of types of knowledge—what Malecki and the OECD called know-
why basic knowledge, know-what recipes, know-how abilities and know-who 
contextual knowledge—embedded in an array of stages of knowledge mobilisation, 
ranging from contextual information and knowledge systems through a variety of 
creation, innovation and socialisation processes (see Figure 1).7,8,9 
 
 
Figure 1: A general mapping of the innovation system 
 
                                                 
5
 P David and S Foray, “Assessing and Expanding the Science and Technology Knowledge Base” 
(1995) 16 STI Review 13 - 68. 
6
 See for example: P Romer, “The Soft Revolution: Achieving Growth by Managing Intangibles” 
(1998) 11 Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 8-14. Reprinted in J Hand and B Lev, eds., Intangible 
Assets: Values, Measures, and Risks (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 63-94 at 64-65.; D 
Teece, Managing Intellectual Capital: Organizational, Strategic, and Policy Dimensions (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000); K E Sveiby, The New Organizational Wealth: Managing and 
Measuring Knowledge-Based Assets (San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 1997). 
7
 PWB Phillips, Governing transformative technological innovation: Who’s in charge? (Oxford: 
Edward Elgar, 2007). 
8
 E Malecki, Technology and economic development: the dynamics of local, regional and national 
competitiveness (Toronto: Longman, 1997). 
9
 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), “The knowledge based 
economy” (1996) available at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/51/8/1913021.pdf  (last accessed 15 March 
2010). 
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Different types of knowledge, whether tacit or codified, can thus be treated as an 
‘object’ under the control of processes by which innovation systems operate. 
How one draws distinctions between ‘processes’ and the ‘objects’ of those processes 
when discussing innovation turns out to be quite important. For more than forty years, 
‘innovation’ has been characterised as a process – “…not a single action but a total 
process of interrelated sub-processes. It is not just the conception of a new idea, nor 
the invention of a new device, nor the development of a new market. The process is 
all of these things acting in an integrated fashion toward a common objective.”10 More 
recently, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, in the third 
edition of the Oslo Manual for Collecting and Interpreting Innovation Data, described 
innovation as: 
[A] continuous process, and therefore difficult to measure […] 
Innovations are defined in the Manual as significant changes, with 
the intention of distinguishing significant changes from routine, 
minor changes. However, it is important to recognise that an 
innovation can also consist of a series of minor incremental 
changes.11 
Conversely, elsewhere in the Manual the OECD defines ‘innovation’ not as a process, 
but as the outcome of a process: “[a]n innovation is the implementation of a new or 
significantly improved product (good or service), or process, a new marketing 
method, or a new organisational method in business practices, workplace organisation 
or external relations.”12 As an output or outcome, innovations would potentially lend 
themselves to quantification, thus providing long-desired metrics for evaluating 
innovative performance, for benchmarking OECD and other nations, and for better 
understanding the implementation of activities that foster measurable improvements. 
Unfortunately, innovation conceived as an output or outcome proves to be too diffuse 
and difficult to define – is it creative acts that are being measured, ‘quanta’ of 
knowledge, ‘flows’ of knowledge? Because of these and other difficulties in 
construing innovation as a process, the systems approach in which innovation is 
construed as a process dominates the innovation systems literature. 
The matter of metrics for innovation is now largely left to intellectual property rights, 
which have been suggestively referred to as the ‘quanta of innovation.’13 Patents 
especially have been described as “the only observable manifestation of inventive 
activity with a well-grounded claim for universality,” a perspective which has been 
                                                 
10
 S Myers and DG Marquis, Successful Industrial Innovations: A Study of Factors Underlying 
Innovation in Selected Firms (Washington, DC: National Science Foundation, 1969). 
11
 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Oslo Manual: Guidelines for 
Collecting and Interpreting Innovation Data, Third Edition (Paris: OECD and Eurostat, 2005) at 40. 
12
 Ibid at 46. 
13
 A Holbrook, “Are Intellectual Property Rights Quanta of Innovation?” in D Castle (ed) The Role of 
Intellectual Property Rights in Biotechnology Innovation (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Press, 2009) 
24-36. 
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echoed in some of the most influential writings on evaluating innovation systems.14,15 
Intellectual property rights function as currencies of exchange, and are treated as 
major assets of knowledge-intensive firms. Spin-off firms from university led 
research may have no other assets than what is held in their intellectual property 
portfolios, and patents are often singly responsible for attracting venture funding and 
attracting subsequent firm acquisitions. Patents, often treated as if they were 
substitutes for cash, function as measures of innovativeness and are themselves 
important endpoints in various sub-processes comprising innovation systems. As 
Lessig remarks, the conventional view is that “[g]etting more progress is the 
constitutional aim of patents.”16 
Significant disagreement exists about the role of patents in innovation systems, 
mainly as to whether they foster or hinder innovation, but that point is not being 
debated here.17 At issue is the blind spot to other more fundamental issues about the 
types of knowledge that are created and exchanged. The literature on innovation is 
thoroughly engrossed with intellectual property rights, yet not all knowledge is the 
subject matter of a patent or copyright. Furthermore, the appearance of intellectual 
property rights is a late stage phenomenon in the path from invention to innovation, 
with many other acts of knowledge creation and exchange occurring upstream. 
Reflection on the suitability of intellectual property rights as tools to manage 
knowledge embedded throughout the myriad of exchanges and interactions in 
innovation systems leads to questions about whether there are alternative ways of 
being innovative without over-reliance on, or a preoccupation with, intellectual 
property rights.18 Put differently, how would discourse about innovation systems 
develop if intellectual property rights were de-emphasised without entirely ignoring 
them – the ‘un-IP’ stance adopted here. Perhaps more crucially to a fuller 
understanding of innovation, a focus on instruments of intellectual property protection 
over-illuminates one stage of the flow of knowledge in innovation, leaving up- and 
down-stream phases in relative obscurity. Knowledge is an intangible asset, and is 
produced, tracked, managed, and accounted for in innovation systems. Yet what 
remains unclear, and this is problematic, are the respective roles of knowledge and 
                                                 
14
 M Trajtenberg, Economic Analysis of Product Innovation: The Case of CT Scanners (Harvard: 
Harvard University Press, 1990). 
15
 JL Furman, ME Porter and S Stern, “The Determinants of National Innovative Capacity (2002) 31 
Research Policy 899-933, at 909. 
16
 L Lessig, The Future of Ideas (New York: Vintage, 2002) at 205. 
17
 See for example these different approaches to the same question: D Castle (ed) The Role of 
Intellectual Property Rights in Biotechnology Innovation (UK: Edward Elgar Press, 2009); WM Cohen 
and SA Merrill (eds) Committee on Intellectual Property Rights in Knowledge-Based Economies: 
Patents in the Knowledge-Based Economy (Washingon: National Academies 2004); M Heller, The 
Gridlock Economy: How Too Much Ownership Wrecks Markets, Stops Innovation, and Costs Lives 
(New York: Basic Books, 2008); AW Torrance and B Tomlinson, “Patents and the Regress of Useful 
Arts” (2009) 10 The Columbia Science and Technology Law Review 130-68. 
18
 The International Expert Group on Biotechnology, Innovation and Intellectual Property. Innovation 
and Intellectual Property, Toward a new era of intellectual property: from confrontation to 
negotiation. (Montreal: The Innovation Partnership, 2008). Available at 
http://www.theinnovationpartnership.org/en/ieg/report/ (last accessed on 15 March 2010). 
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intellectual property management, their relation, and the potential of a broadened 
perspective on knowledge flows in innovation. 
3. The Problem with Over-Reliance on Patents in Innovation Systems 
The relationship between knowledge management and intellectual property rights was 
the topic of a 10 December 2008 workshop for researchers from the United Kingdom 
and Canada. Held at the Faculty of Law, University of Edinburgh, under Chatham 
House Rules, the workshop provided an opportunity for an open and frank 
conversation between researchers working in a wide range of academic and applied 
fields, both directly and indirectly relevant to the issue of knowledge management and 
its relationship to intellectual property.19 Each participant was asked to come prepared 
to make a presentation or to offer details from case studies. As a heuristic, the group 
was asked to consider whether IP could be abandoned (in some or all cases) and, if so, 
what issues would arise for business, law, policy and funders. The focus of the 
discussion was to identify a program of research or research themes that emerge when 
an ‘un-IP’ stance is adopted.  
The most general conclusion was that intellectual property rights are not a defining 
feature of innovation systems. That is, intellectual property rights and mechanisms for 
creating and managing them are contingent artefacts of innovation systems. Indeed in 
many instances, rather than being fundamental drivers of innovation, IPRs are 
somewhat incidental to innovation, and to innovation systems. If one adopts a more 
holistic and realistic approach to innovation, conceptualising the innovation system as 
a complex and comprehensive system of knowledge generation and management, 
then IPRs are clearly components, but not the system itself. This demonstrates that 
even when intellectual property rights are precisely defined and specific applications 
are clear, the use of the rights depends primarily on their role within innovation more 
generally. Broader systems of knowledge creation and exchange set the context for 
the IP rights to be protected, how IP rights relate to each other, and how others 
interpret the significance of the intellectual property claim. 
Given these observations, the workshop participants identified and explored (at least 
preliminarily) eight associated themes about the role and position of intellectual 
property in the broader innovation setting. These themes are related by their basis in 
the literature of innovation systems and knowledge management discussed in the 
preceding two sections, and because they support understandings of innovation and 
further contextualise the role of IP rights. More specifically, the following 
propositions were identified as areas ripe for further consideration and research: 
1. knowledge management is inclusive of intellectual property rights; 
2. systems of intellectual property rights are not monolithic, consistent, or 
perfected; 
                                                 
19
 “When a meeting, or part thereof, is held under the Chatham House Rule, participants are free to use 
the information received, but neither the identity nor the affiliation of the speaker(s), nor that of any 
other participant, may be revealed." Available at 
http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/about/chathamhouserule/ (last accessed on 15 March 2010). 
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3. knowledge management strategies dictate the tactics of intellectual property 
rights; 
4. interpreting the purpose of patents is contextualised in knowledge 
management; 
5. knowledge mobilisation versus returns to inventors; 
6. patent or perish?; 
7. social control of knowledge: intellectual property rights in society; 
8. no definitive role for patents in the management of knowledge in innovation 
systems. 
3.1. Knowledge Management is Inclusive of Intellectual Property Rights 
Conceptually speaking, within innovation systems intellectual property rights are a 
species of knowledge management. Some aspects of knowledge management well 
known in innovation policy circles include for example research funders’ annual 
reports regarding their knowledge transfer / translation / mobilisation portfolios. At 
the same time academic literature, industry trade publications, and government 
reporting mechanisms focus on IP rights and their specific features related to 
individual technologies. Even though knowledge management is a more 
comprehensive activity involving the creation, transmission, use and storage of 
information and knowledge in a wide range of areas, IP rights are so widely discussed 
that they are lent the appearance of being comprehensive. Intellectual property rights 
are relevant and used in only a few of the sub-processes of innovation just mentioned, 
nor are they present in all of the interrelations described above in Fagerberg’s broader 
definition of the innovation system. Knowledge management cannot, and should not, 
therefore be defined solely in terms of policies and practices geared toward the 
management of intellectual property rights. The converse is equally relevant: 
expectations of outcomes from the management of IP rights do not exhaust the 
expectations one might have for effective knowledge management.  
3.2. Systems of Intellectual Property Rights are not Monolithic, Consistent, or 
Perfected 
Advocates of and detractors from intellectual property rights - particularly academics 
who engage in policy debates about intellectual property but not legal debates about 
the law - often characterise systems of intellectual property rights as if they were self-
consistent and universal. In reality, the variety of systems and complexity with which 
these interact is far greater than many imagine. Intellectual property rights are not 
anchored in a homogeneous global system, but comprise a set of incomplete, 
overlapping and interlocking subsystems of property protections and rules. 
Fundamentally, the systems are based on legal codes within civil and common law 
jurisdictions which ascribe rights to ownership and control to creators (i.e. authors, 
thinkers and inventors) and provide the base for transmitting those rights to others. 
While the systems have the same general intent, and have been increasingly subject to 
international harmonisation through international treaties, they operate in slightly 
different ways. Beyond basic distinctions between types of legal rights and authorities 
embedded in the legal systems, national governments have created a number of 
specific mechanisms to encourage creation and exploitation of specific types of 
knowledge and their resulting goods or services. 
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Here legal rights and moral rights generally mesh, but not in all countries (e.g. the 
United States), and differentially according to national laws, institutions and practices 
as well as international agreements (e.g. the Berne Convention). The subject matter of 
intellectual property rights also varies considerably. Copyright is almost universally 
provided for a range of works, including written, dramatic and musical works; 
trademarks protect proprietary identifiers; patents assign rights and duties in the case 
of the United States for ‘anything under the sun made by man’ (generally defined in 
legislation as novel, useful and non-obvious inventions) but restrictions are imposed 
on patentable subject matter in the European Union, Canada and Japan; trade secret 
protection addresses obligations - primarily that of confidentiality - related to 
proprietary knowledge embedded in production systems; and plant breeders’ rights 
and animal pedigrees deal with innovations and advancements involving plants and 
animals. In addition to these specific systems, companies use an array of contracts and 
other civil agreements to bind and restrict the use of their knowledge (e.g. trademarks 
for extending protection to off-patent drugs, to restrict disclosure of trade secrets and 
to prohibit reproduction and use of proprietary knowledge, processes or materials).20 
While all of these systems started as national compromises between the rights of 
creators/inventors (or at least importers of new knowledge) and the interests of 
potential users, the underlying concepts are becoming increasingly international in 
reach. International conventions over the past 150 years have harmonised various 
aspects of copyright, trademarks and patents. The difficulty is that each of the 
international agreements provides at most ‘best efforts’ adjudication by national 
courts, so that at the international level disputes about contested property rights 
remain. In 1994, with the establishment of the World Trade Organization and the 
negotiation of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
(TRIPS), all Member states (153 in 2008) were required to develop minimum 
standards for property rights systems, and provide national treatment to all forms of 
intellectual property from all member states. Developed countries were immediately 
bound by TRIPs, developing countries were given until 2006 to phase in the 
requirements, and least developed countries have a longer time frame in which to 
fully implement TRIPS, exceeding the previously set deadline of 2006. While TRIPS 
would appear to meet the need of providing minimum standards for engaging 
countries in an international system of intellectual property rights, the system is far 
from complete and effective. The rules and enforcement of disputes remain the 
prerogative of individual nation states, which means there is still potential for conflict 
— as of 15 August 2009, the WTO reported 156 completed or on-going disputes 
involving matters covered under TRIPS. Moreover, flexibilities available under 
TRIPS that may be used by countries to develop a system suitable to their stage of 
development continue to foster controversy. 
                                                 
20
 PWB Phillips and G Khachatourians, The biotechnology revolution in global agriculture: invention, 
innovation and investment in the canola sector (Wallingford, UK: CABI Publishing, 2001). 
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3.3. Knowledge Management Strategies Dictate the Tactics of Intellectual Property 
Rights 
The application and use of intellectual property mechanisms varies widely with the 
type of process or product involved. As noted, intellectual property rights are part of a 
complex system of knowledge management and are a relatively late-stage 
phenomenon on the path from invention to innovation. Thus, readily visible 
intellectual property rights, such as patents, are more representative of the tip of an 
iceberg rather than the entire system. The actual pattern of use varies by sector. 
Patents are probably a good reflection of the underlying property claims in product 
areas where they have been used for a long period, such as for industrial machinery 
and consumer products. Generally, economies of scale work to deter all but the most 
determined competitors. Innovators then use a mix of contracts, trade secrets and 
trademarks to control market access and competition. Patents, however, remain the 
baseline currency in those areas. 
In contrast, biotechnology products such as genetically modified Bt (Bacillus 
thuringiensis) corn involve a wide range of patents (for transformation technologies, 
genes and seeds), trade secrets (on elite breeding lines), plant breeders’ rights (on 
seeds), trade marks (on corporate brands), private contracts (on seeds) and copyrights 
(on underlying science published in journals). Other crops such as canola use most of 
those property mechanisms (except perhaps trade secrets) but the owners claim and 
defend their rights more narrowly. In the case of canola, for example, intellectual 
property rights are pursued largely in Canada and selectively in the United States and 
the European Union.21 By contrast, in vegetable crops, patents are not at issue.22 
Transgenic or conventionally bred fish varieties are subject to few formal property 
rights; innovators instead rely primarily on the use of private contracts to control 
breeding stock.23 Scientists and firms seeking to modify and use wood or fibre from 
trees tend to rely less on patents due to the long period before trees reach economic 
maturity (ranging from ten-seventy years) relative to the limited term of patents 
(twenty years). 
Other technology and product markets use a different mix of intellectual property 
rights. Drugs are controlled closely through many of the rights regimes used by plant 
developers (excepting plant breeders’ rights). But rights are usually claimed and 
defended only by multinational corporations in (mostly developed) nations where 
there is potential for profitable production and use of those products, although this is 
changing as the number of developing countries with drug development and 
manufacturing capacity increases. The international trade regime bolsters any owner’s 
position by erecting rules forbidding trade in unlicensed intellectual property. In 
contrast, while software and business methods can be patented in the United States, 
                                                 
21
 Ibid. (Phillips and Khachatourians 2001). 
22
 PJ Heald and S Chapman, “Patents and Vegetable Crop Diversity” (2009) No. 09-017 University of 
Georgia School of Law Research Paper Series available at 
http://www.law.syr.edu/media/paper/2010/2/PATENTS_AND_VEGETABLE_CROP_DIVERSITY.p
df (last accessed on 15 March 2010). 
23
 Culver K and D. Castle (eds), Aquaculture, Innovation and Social Transformation (Dordrecht: 
Springer, 2008). 
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because of the short lifecycle of most software, most developers either use copyright 
or protect their trade secrets through encryption; some programmers, taking the advice 
of Shapiro and Varian, offer open-source access. This approach offers access to 
source-code unrestricted by copyright, generally with specialised licensing conditions 
to contribute, in the case of software, to the evolution of the source-code. 
Additionally, a combination of network effects, branding and versioning are used to 
commercially exploit their innovation.24 Meanwhile, chemicals, some industrial 
materials and many processed food stuffs (e.g. Coca Cola) rely on trade secrets rather 
than patents. In most cases, the recipes for making them cannot be determined by 
reverse engineering the end-product—the ingredients and process are masked because 
the end-use composite material has been transformed in the production process. These 
firms prefer to rely on trade secrets because they provide universal and - in contrast to 
the other time-limited forms of intellectual property rights - unlimited protection for 
their intellectual property. The risk calculation is the probability of disclosure of the 
trade secret after which protection no longer operates. In summary, this brief 
overview clearly shows that one cannot simply use a single intellectual property 
mechanism, such as patents, as a proxy for activity, value or innovation, as they play 
different, contingent roles in the economy, depending on the nature of the knowledge 
that needs to be managed and its market application. 
3.4. Interpreting the Purpose of Patents is Contextualised in Knowledge 
Management 
While the preceding section describes the variety of intellectual property protection 
that is available, the dominant form in the innovation system, and the one that has 
received the most attention, is patenting. The purpose of patents remains a source of 
significant debate. At root, there is a divide between those who see patents as a means 
and those who define them as an end in themselves. Ultimately, most scholars and 
practitioners would fundamentally agree that the value and purpose of patents and 
other IP rights is not to have the right, but rather to exploit the right to extract 
profits/rents from the market. Patents are important milestones in a research and 
development pathway, but do not generate value directly, in and of themselves, and 
actually require considerable resources to develop and maintain. Rather, one view is 
that the prospect of limited monopoly profits resulting from patents and other 
intellectual property rights encourages firms to invest in risky research and, perhaps 
more importantly, in efforts at commercialisation engaging in activities such as 
reducing to practice, scale-up and compliance with regulations. 
The allocation of profits among inventors and assignees tends to support conventional 
wisdom that inventors get royalties and other payments equal to about one to three 
percent of the value generated by their invention. The remainder accrues to others in 
the supply chain and to end users. Nevertheless, many scholars and most users of 
legal property instruments tend to see patents or other complementary property 
mechanisms as valuable in their own right. This creates a potential problem as ‘what 
gets measured gets done.’ Public research institutions, universities and many 
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entrepreneurial firms count and display patents and other intellectual property rights 
as ‘outputs’ of their systems—now more than 600 public institutions in North 
America have technology transfer programs or offices that count patents as one 
measure of output.25 An Association of University Technology Managers survey of 
189 public institutions in North America reported that in 2006 they managed 18,874 
new invention disclosures, filed 15,908 American patent applications and saw 3,255 
United States patents issued.26 This focus on patents as having value in and of 
themselves is partly a response to the difficulty of measuring their real effect. While 
most property rights mechanisms have some identifiable, narrow, uniquely focused 
application and value, that value is almost always dependent on the nested, dense, 
complex system of governance of the technology or product. At the extreme, some 
technology offices practice a form of patent fetishism, where the patents are ends 
rather than the means of further commercialisation. 
One alternate view is that patents have no intrinsic value. The Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development estimates that only about ten to twenty 
percent of academic patents ever earn any revenue, and many of those that earn 
revenue frequently do not recover the cost of setting up and negotiating the 
intellectual property relationship.27 Many patents simply act as expensive ‘vanity art’ 
to decorate the walls of inventors’ homes and offices. Indiscriminate patenting by 
technology transfer offices can also create patents of limited commercial value whose 
coverage cannot be improved once research results are published. Trajtenberg 
undertook a detailed analysis of patents used in the CAT-Scan industry, and 
concluded that value cannot be scientifically imputed or assigned to patents with any 
confidence; rather, patents are better seen as a signpost of activity along the value 
chain.28 The more patents there are, the greater the volume of inventive activity 
(analogous to the rule that the number of articles reflects the volume of primary 
research activity). In this context, they should rather be seen as milestones in the 
innovation process.  
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3.5. Knowledge Mobilisation versus Returns to Inventors 
Lessig’s remark about getting more progress out of patents is meant to be provocative 
and fruitfully vague. The ‘access / incentive’ paradigm of patents, according to which 
inventors disclose to the public in exchange for limited control over their inventions, 
promotes two conceptions of progress. Progress, for the public, is disclosure of 
knowledge, while for innovators it is financial. Is the social or financial return worth 
anything? Unfortunately, there are little more than platitudes regarding the value of 
the social benefits of disclosure and rich mythologies surrounding the returns that 
inventors receive for their patents. 
The methodology of evaluating the returns to research and the value generated by 
patented technology and products varies widely. Economists attempt to estimate all of 
the costs and benefits to producers (resulting from changes in production efficiencies 
or changes in market shares or asset values), to consumers (from new consumer traits 
or changes in prices), to the environment and society (through positive externalities 
such as health benefits or negative externalities such as pollution) or to governments 
(through changes in taxes or expenditures). In the simplest case where there are 
competitive supply and demand markets, the gains to any innovation are the resulting 
increased consumer or producer surplus. Consumer surplus is value generated by 
consumption that exceeds the market price (i.e. any value of consumption that 
exceeds the market clearing price), while producer surplus is the differential profits 
gained by particularly efficient producers from selling products at market clearing 
prices above their marginal costs. 
Economic analysis of the gains to research has progressed significantly over recent 
years, from Griliches’s article on the returns to hybrid corn to the comprehensive 
‘bible’ on economic valuation produced by Alston, Norton and Pardey.29,30 In effect, 
economists have framed the issue as one of comparative statics, where value is 
generated through efficiencies in the supply chain or through new product attributes. 
Because of the availability of data related to research investments, innovations, 
production and consumption, much of the applied economics on the gains to 
innovation has been undertaken in the agri-food sector. Alston et al surveyed more 
than 294 studies in the agri-food sector undertaken in the previous 30 years and found 
1,821 estimates of returns ranging from -100% (e.g. the project yielded no benefits for 
the investment) to +724,000% (a suspect return).31 Ignoring the extreme results at 
both the top and bottom, they estimated that the mean internal rate of return to agri-
food research was 72%. Recent debate has concluded that those estimates may be too 
optimistic because they (a) ignore many projects that failed, (b) many of the ex ante 
analyses assume a faster and longer period of economic return than many investments 
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actually realised, (c) many of the studies ignore any potential positive or negative 
externalities and (d) many of the successful investments destroy capital in other 
technologies or products, which lowers the net value of the investments. In fact, some 
longitudinal analyses suggest that a full accounting of investments could reveal that 
the return on investment has in some instances fallen below the cost of capital.32 
Practitioners tend to be more sanguine about the returns to investment because they 
only value parts of the gains that economists examine. For example, venture 
capitalists and owners of capital are primarily concerned about the returns that they 
can extract. Hence, their estimates ignore the un-priced value to consumers, any 
spillovers to other producers and sectors and any social externalities. Similarly, 
governments tend to be most concerned about the returns that will accrue to firms, 
citizens and the treasury in their jurisdiction, and thereby tend to ignore benefits and 
costs that flow to offshore consumers, producers, investors and governments. As a 
result, when marginal investments are under discussion, economists may give an 
absolute green light while management consultants or governments may be less 
positive. 
3.6. Patent or Perish? 
Patents are often credited for creating limited monopolies with correspondingly 
limited monopoly profits – so long as no close substitute is available. While that may 
be true for a narrow range of technologies or products, it is not generally true. Patents 
have the greatest value when there are no close substitutes being produced, when 
there is no need for complementary investments or spending (such as expensive 
equipment to produce or use a product) and when consumer demand is relatively 
inelastic with respect to price. Drugs that treat specific diseases often fit that model. In 
contrast, innovations in the agri-food system often face close substitutes in 
production, for example open pollinated varieties of crops that are almost as good as 
comparators, and require expensive capital investments to produce and compete with 
competitively priced products that offer many of the same benefits. In those cases, the 
potential to extract a return on the research investment can be very limited. This at 
least partly explains the consistent gap in returns on investment during the past decade 
between the pharmaceutical industry, which earned greater than 35 percent, and the 
agri-food industry (including farming) that earned well below ten percent. Given the 
variation in returns by sector, and of course by technology, and the uncertainty that a 
best-case scenario will emerge, there may be better ways of using intellectual property 
systems for more effective knowledge management strategies. Drawing on sectors, 
such as aquaculture, that are not patent-intensive but are nevertheless profitable, 
suggests that the patent-or-perish paradigm is its own form of lock-in. To a major 
extent, sector-by-sector variation in patenting activity is guided by the cost of 
technology development and the time between innovations. 
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3.7. Social Control of Knowledge: Intellectual Property Rights in Society 
Discussion of the broader function of patents illuminates perspectives on knowledge 
management more than it does patents. Some see patents and other intellectual 
property rights as heuristics or signalling tools, signifying some other related concept. 
For example, venture capitalists are concerned to find signals indicating how well a 
market position can be developed and maintained. Patents play an important role in 
identifying the underlying value of an enterprise, and can further be used to signal the 
commercial orientation of scientists. In short: ‘no patents, no investment.’ The state, 
in contrast, sometimes uses patent policy to signal its degree of openness to business. 
Often it will make patents more binding as an inexpensive and focused way to signal 
its intentions to others. Similarly, many states use patents as the mechanism for 
assigning obligations and liabilities. Meanwhile many social action groups and non-
governmental organisations knowingly use patents as a rhetorical focusing device to 
target debate on pre-selected villains and on specific target issues. The demonisation 
of genetically modified foods by making reference to ‘frankenfoods” and of genetic 
use restriction technologies as ‘terminator’ seeds has effectively orchestrated 
international debate in a way that makes it difficult for other perspectives to engage 
effectively. Academics, management consultants and others, in contrast, use patents 
and other intellectual property rights as visible artefacts of social networks, letting 
them define and measure the interrelationships of individuals in specific fields and 
jurisdictions. 
3.8. No Definitive Role for Patents in the Management of Knowledge in Innovation 
Systems 
Given the various heuristic roles patents play as part of the larger knowledge 
management system, it perhaps makes sense that they have not been validated in any 
comprehensive way. Here we encounter a fundamental difficulty. We are still unable 
to agree on the meaning of the inventive concept such that inventions may be defined 
identically across all conceivable contexts and fields of science and technology. This 
situation and the size of the economic stakes that may be involved challenge our 
ability to comprehend objectively the “personal scale” of inventive activity relating to 
any given patent. Identification of sources of invention is inherently subjective. 
Consequently - beneath the scientific veneer - preconception, bias and assumptions 
prevail, some of which may be self-serving. There seem to be four ways in which 
people understand inventions and their origins, all of which cannot be correct in all 
cases. The problem is our temptation to generalise.33  
First, inventions can be seen as ‘thunderstorms’ of activity, where the flashes of 
lightning and the booming thunder represent creative action, but the discrete 
individual events tend to get lost in the fury of the storm. In other words, inventions 
are inherently collective, comprising small acts or ideas identifiable to individuals 
which together make up the whole invention. This notion is convenient for businesses, 
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especially when all of the people concerned are employees of the same firm! Second, 
inventions might be seen as thunderbolts, or distinctive flashes of individual 
inspiration, where what was there before the storm is transformed and new. Some of 
these thunderbolts add value, others transmit energy without any lasting effect and 
still others lay waste to what previously existed. This is a rather old-fashioned view 
but it is very persistent. Historically, corporations dislike this conception, since it 
underpinned the flash of genius test which required a bigger inventive step than was 
commercially convenient. Third, inventions may be seen as being like a relay race, 
where the first past the post (either the actual invention in the United States or patent 
filing elsewhere) wins the prize, regardless of how narrow the margin of victory. 
Again, inventing is anything but an anonymous activity but it tends to be drawn out. 
Sometimes the winner is considered to be unfairly taking all when the ‘spoils’ ought 
to be shared with the other baton carriers who may have run further. Fourth, invention 
may be seen as being like a termite nest, where too many people are involved for it to 
be possible to name everybody. Consequently, for anybody to file a patent is 
tantamount to grabbing a piece of the intellectual commons. Given the wide array of 
metaphoric interpretations of inventions, it is only reasonable that the scholars and 
practitioners who work on patents and patent policy have not conclusively established 
the place, role and function of patents in the global knowledge management system. 
4. Lessons Learned and Future Directions 
Perceived and demonstrated ills of over-reliance on intellectual property rights, 
especially patents, have led many to think that the innovation system could perform 
better if fewer restrictions were placed on the flow of knowledge – that is, to bring 
more products and services to market to create wealth and foster the well being of 
citizens. Alternatives being explored include open-source licensing, patent pools and 
more open knowledge markets. Each proposes techniques for making knowledge 
more readily available, an end in itself, and to stimulate creativity in the ‘useful arts.’ 
None of the proposed approaches argues against intellectual property per se, rather 
each attempts to alter downstream effects of restrictive licensing practices and create 
alternative cultures of sharing that displace cultures of hoarding. The proposed 
approaches are more a matter of what one does with intellectual property, assuming 
one already has it. 
The ‘un-IP’ stance suggests that there may be more radical work to be done in 
rethinking the role of intellectual property in innovation systems by re-contextualising 
intellectual property management within the broader context of knowledge 
management. Thinking upstream, for a moment, most laboratories keep detailed daily 
records and meticulously maintained databases. This is done partly for legal reasons. 
In the United States, records help establish priority claims regarding who was first to 
invent. Of greater legal importance, for patent filing purposes, is who made the 
inventive step, and, for purposes of ownership, under whose sponsorship the research 
was conducted. Whether the information contained therein is ever going to be 
patentable subject matter is anyone’s guess, but the pursuit of scientific discovery or 
technical invention places priority on the careful record keeping and accountability 
that are indicative of good knowledge management practices. The scientific 
justification for careful record keeping is even more fundamentally important. It 
ensures that science is properly recorded so that others can build on it; observations 
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peripheral to the initial purpose of the work can be recorded and used by others; the 
integrity and robustness of the work can be assessed and challenged. 
Comparing the relative importance of legal and scientific justification for careful 
record keeping, there is a sense in which there is no intellectual property in an 
invention, but there is a tremendous amount of knowledge management. It is easy to 
say that beyond intellectual property rights there is knowledge management, and 
perhaps it comes as no surprise that the general conclusion is that intellectual property 
rights have to be subsumed under knowledge management. The more substantive 
contribution, however, is the observation that the eight themes articulated above 
reflect a three-fold tension between knowledge management and intellectual property 
rights that arose once the ‘un-IP’ stance was adopted. 
First, there is still a lack of clarity about the overall relationship between intellectual 
property rights and knowledge as it is created and exchanged in innovation systems if 
they are not exhaustive of all creativity and value. The persistent and unresolved 
concern is that intellectual property rights are not natural kinds in the sense that they 
often capture knowledge in innovation systems contingently. What has been 
previously patented, for example, can deter innovators from returning to the same 
domain of research and development, or, depending on the field, the researchers, the 
available public funding or private financing, a return to the same field can be seen as 
strategic. One way of characterising the issue is that the knowledge management 
perspective requires the view that intellectual property rights create quanta of 
knowledge out of a larger knowledge pool, rather than isolating already individuated 
units of knowledge that are appropriate candidates for formal protection. A corollary 
is that intellectual property rights are neither an effective variable to explain much of 
knowledge management in innovation systems nor are they an appropriate proxy for 
the system. 
Second, the predilection to equate value with intellectual property rights leads 
governments, the private sector, and increasingly universities and colleges, to pursue 
patenting strategies that may not be fruitful. Increased rates of patenting appear to be 
slowed only by trends in government research funding and the priorities of venture 
capitalists; meanwhile there is increasing evidence that the returns are not 
forthcoming. There is a strong need to assess the real role and value of patents, 
particularly if there are social opportunity costs of current patenting strategies that 
become all the more apparent when intellectual property rights are recast in light of 
the priorities of knowledge management. Two fundamental changes are needed in the 
way intellectual property rights are managed. One is to stop assuming the role of 
patents and develop more counterfactuals to test whether patents actually deliver what 
they promise. This approach is being used increasingly in research studies but has yet 
to have much impact on the debate about patents.34 Another change involves more 
empirical research involving active engagement of scholars and practitioners in the 
construction of research projects and the implementation of fly-on-the-wall 
observation and analysis. Sociologists like Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar did 
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groundbreaking work on the nature of laboratory life.35 Perhaps it is now time for a 
wider range of social scientists to move into technology transfer offices, venture 
capital corporations, law offices, regulatory agencies and corporations to document 
and test the role of patents in the complex global knowledge management system. 
Finally, perhaps the most remarkable aspect of these reflections on the relationship 
between knowledge management and intellectual property rights is the difficulty, 
faced even by willing workshop participants, of adopting the ‘un-IP’ stance. The 
general conclusion and the eight themes developed above help to orient the problem 
toward a discussion of what is wrong with patents, whether to patent or not, and what 
can be done to improve the advantages of patents while reducing the problems. 
Instead of being the dominant theme in the discussion, knowledge management in 
innovation systems frequently slipped into the role of leitmotif and patents were the 
idée fixe. This is a telling observation, one that suggests that adapting to a new 
discourse about knowledge management that tracks the proposed eight themes, or 
other themes that may be subsequently developed, will remain a challenge. 
 
                                                 
35
 B Latour and S Woolgar, Laboratory Life: the Social Construction of Scientific Facts, (Los Angeles: 
Sage, 1979). 
